Natural-resource abundance is a blessing for some countries, but a curse for others. We provide empirical evidence that shows that differences across countries in the degree of fiscal decentralization can contribute to this divergent outcome. The paper first employs Sachs and Warner's cross-sectional data and finds support for the novel hypothesis. Then, it extends the sample, and presents IV and panel data robustness tests that confirm the results. We also offer a theory of inter-regional tax competition that rationalizes the findings. Under fiscal decentralization, a more resource abundant region charges lower taxes that attract capital from other parts of the country. If labor is not fully mobile, the gains generated by a resource windfall may not compensate for the efficiency losses caused by the tax competition, generating a loss in the country's aggregate income. This effect is amplified by the existence of differences in agglomeration between natural-resource rich and natural-resource poor areas.
Introduction
Since the influential works of Sachs and Warner (1997 , 2001 ) the so-called resource curse puzzle, describing an inverse relationship between resource abundance and economic growth, has attracted considerable attention. Further studies have provided additional empirical evidence of this phenomenon as well as various potential explanations for its occurrence. Among these explanations, the literature has emphasized political factors, corruption, underdeveloped legal and financial systems, Dutch disease mechanisms, or human-capital inhibiting institutions. 1 This paper contributes to this strand of the literature, presenting a novel explanation: the level of fiscal decentralization. 2 Our main hypothesis is that fiscally decentralized economies are more vulnerable to the growth curse of natural resources than fiscally centralized ones. Figure 1 illustrates the potential of this variable to explain the curse. The figure plots the average annual real per capita GDP growth from 1970
to 1990 versus the share of mineral output in total GDP in 1970. 3 Panel A is based on a sample of 52 countries, and provides a strong indication for an occurrence of a resource curse. In panels B and C, the sample is split into two equal sub-samples according to the degree of fiscal decentralization (a measure to be discussed in-detail in the empirical part) in 1970; results indicate that a resource curse appears in countries with a relatively higher degree of fiscal decentralization (panel B), yet it completely disappears in countries with a relatively lower degree of fiscal decentralization (panel C). 4 A more specific example is Venezuela versus Botswana. Both are heavily endowed 1 For a detailed discussion see, for example, recent surveys by Frankel (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011). For a recent contribution, which finds evidence of the curse across US states, see Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) . 2 Fiscal decentralization comprises the financial aspects of devolution to regional and local governments, and it covers two main interrelated issues. The first is the division of spending responsibilities and revenue sources between levels of government. The second is the amount of discretion given to regional and local governments to determine their expenditure and revenues. The definition adopted in this paper concerns both issues, yet emphasizes the latter. 3 Data on state-level primary output and GDP was retrieved from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 4 The countries in panel B are: Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, West Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia. The countries in panel C are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea Republic, Malawi, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, and United States. , while the latter presented one of the highest positive growth rates during that time. According to the Fiscal Decentralization Indicators of the World Bank, the economy of Venezuela is highly fiscally decentralized whereas that of Botswana is the most centralized in the sample. Let us consider other resource abundant countries. 5 Some of the most fiscally centralized include Azerbaijan, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia and Norway; all of which performed (growth-wise) remarkably well in the periods investigated in our samples. Conversely, some of the most fiscally decentralized nations include Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico, and Zambia; all of which performed rather poorly during the same time frames.
We present a model that postulates that this effect can be a consequence of tax competition and labor market rigidities, amplified by differences in the degree of agglomeration economies across a country's regions. 6 When labor is less mobile than capital, and inputs display diminishing marginal returns, capital reallocations can be welfare reducing. In particular, if a region that enjoys a resource windfall finds optimal to reduce taxes, it will attract capital from other parts of the country; but this can lead to a net loss in GDP for the country as a whole if the inefficiency effect offsets the increase in natural output. 7 Agglomeration economies contribute to amplify the negative impact of the labor market inefficiency. 8 In addition, the model predicts that if resource-rich regions show lower agglomeration levels, the negative effect of a resource windfall on national income becomes larger. The last remark is important because as figure 2 illustrates for the 5 For the purposes of the following examples, we consider a country to be resource abundant if it consistently has a share of mineral output in total GDP greater than 10 percent. 6 Raveh (2011) studies a similar mechanism termed the Alberta Effect. It does not, however, consider agglomeration economies. 7 Other models of tax competition include, for example, the seminal work of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) . In these models, the assumption of a relatively lower mobility of labor is not unusual, like in Mansoorian and Myers (1993) . In terms of evidence, the degree of inter-regional labor mobility depends on the country being studied. Eichengreen (1993) , for example, estimates an elasticity of inter-regional migration with respect to the ratio of local wages to the national average that is 25 times higher in the U.S. than in the U.K.; the difference with respect to Italy is even larger. As Decressin and Fatas (1995) argue, the result is that regional labor adjustments in Europe occur through a fall in the participation rate instead of through outwards migration. Evidence that supports that better-endowed areas compete more aggressively and drain capital from their poorly endowed counterparts is provided, for example, by Cai and Treisman (2005) for post-communist Russia. 8 Introduced by Marshall (1920) , the concept of agglomeration economies refers to the positive externalities of economic integration at the local level, especially with respect to increased labor market pooling, shared inputs, and knowledge spillovers. checks, we conclude that the confirmation of our hypothesis is robust to using various fiscal decentralization and resource share measures, as well as to different estimation methods and time periods. 9 The agglomeration index comes from Ciccone and Hall (1996) . The index, expressed as a number between one and two and measured for 1988, ranks U.S. states according to their agglomeration level. Appendix 1 presents similar state-level graphs for Australia, Brazil, Germany, Canada, Malaysia, Russia, India, and United Arab Emirates; all of them show similar negative relationships, implying that at regional levels resources indeed locate in non-agglomerated areas.
Other papers very close to our research are the following. Lane and Tornell (1996) suggest that the existence of powerful groups in conjunction with weak institutions provide an explanation for the natural resource curse. Mehlum et al. (2006) The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and performs a calibration exercise. Section 3 provides the empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
In this section, we present a simple model that illustrates and evaluate mechanisms through which fiscal decentralization can interact with natural resources and affect income. More specifically, we explore two channels: lack of labor market mobility, and agglomeration economies.
Regions
Assume that there are  relatively small regions in a country. Out of them, we form two subsets. Within each subset, regions are identical in all aspects; and therefore, it is like if there were only two economies in the model, call them  and . Areas  and  possess the same production and preference structure; they only differ in the endowment of natural riches and population density, characteristics that are taken as exogenous.
To formalize this last assumption, we can follow Ciccone and Hall (1996) , and think that people have a preference for less agglomerated locations, and hence, are willing to accept lower wages there. We can also assume as in Mansoorian and Myers (1993) that individuals derive a non-pecuniary benefit from living in their home; that is, individuals have a preference for a particular region for cultural or nationalistic reasons. The lack of labor mobility is an extreme case scenario that we adopt for simplicity. However, as will become clear later, the only thing that we need for the model results to go through is a sufficiently low degree of labor mobility.
Production
The production function is taken from Ciccone and Hall (1996) . In each area, there exist a large number of profit-maximizing firms of mass one that rent capital () and labor () to produce output ( ). Focusing on area , the production function is given by:
where the parameters   ∈ (0 1), and   1;   is the land area of region ; and  is the Hicks neutral technology level of the nation. The variable   is exogenous, whereas   is endogenous. The elasticity  is less than one by the amount of the share of land on factor payments. The agglomeration externality is captured by the density measure output per hectare     . The elasticity of output with respect to density is a constant and equal to ( − 1).
From equation (1), once the externality is internalized, we obtain
The total output elasticity with respect to labor and capital depends on both the congestion parameter  and the agglomeration parameter . If  is greater than one, the agglomeration effect dominates congestion.
Unlike labor, capital perfectly moves across regions, so that its rental price () is equalized. We can use the first order condition of the firm's problem to get the following demand function for capital:
where   is the tax rate on capital in region . And then
Regional Governments
It is straightforward that, in our setup, a benevolent policymaker that chooses tax rates in a fiscally centralized nation will always generate gains in output as a consequence 6 of the discovery of natural resources. Given this, our analysis focus exclusively on the fiscal decentralization case.
The public sector taxes capital and uses the region's natural input endowment to provide a public consumption good to the economy. Its problem reduces to choosing the tax rate (  ) that maximizes the current utility level of a representative individual.
More specifically, the government in region  solves:
subject to
where   and   are the amounts of the private and the public consumption goods, respectively; and   is the value of natural riches net of extraction costs.
There are a number of implicit assumptions in expressions (6) and (7) . In particular, we suppose that both consumption goods are produced with the same technology. Also, natural riches can be converted into the public good at zero cost.
The government takes as given the interest rate, the firms' demand function (3), and internalizes the external effect of agglomeration. As a consequence, output is given by equation (4) from the government's viewpoint. With those assumptions, the first order condition to the above problem obtains
Equation (8) is a Ramsey-Keynes condition, the marginal rate of substitution (LHS) is equalized to the marginal rate of transformation (RHS). It says that the optimal relative allocation to the private good increases with the size of the agglomeration externality. The reason is that the amount of private good to which you need to renounce for each additional unit of the public good increases with . It also implies that the private-to-public good ratio decreases with the weight of the public good in the utility function.
Substituting conditions (6) and (7) into (8), we can write the optimal capital tax rate as
Expression (9) defines   as an implicit solution because   is actually a function of   . In order to know how the tax rate reacts to changes in exogenous variables and parameters, we can use expressions (3), (4) and (9) which imply that
This equality solves implicitly   as a function of  and region-specific characteristics.
The LHS of expression (11) equals  (1−) when   equals , and rises with   if (1 − )  1 which is the case suggested by the calibration below. Hence, when the last inequality holds, the optimal value of   is unique and decreases with the endowment   . For a sufficiently large value of the natural endowment, the region can fully finance public goods using natural riches, and then the optimal tax rate becomes zero. In particular, expression (11) says that
If, on the other hand,   is  then the tax rate reaches its highest value ( max  ).
When there is no natural endowment, the LHS in equality (11) needs to go to infinity;
In the absence of natural endowment, the optimal tax depends exclusively on the interest rate.
In expression (11) , the effects of the agglomeration externality parameter  and the interest rate are ambiguous. From equality (9), we deduce that their direct impact on   is clear: in (9), the tax rate decreases with the agglomeration externality and rises with the interest rate. However, their general equilibrium effects that work through the physical capital stock   affect   in the opposite direction. For the parameter values calibrated below, the direct effects dominate.
Equilibrium
Governments choose taxes according to (9) . The interest rate  then moves until the capital market clears, that is, until
where  is the nation's capital stock, which is taken as given. At that point, the whole economy is in equilibrium.
The stocks   and   need to be such that the returns to capital are equalized across economies. This non-arbitrage condition is the following:
Employing production function (2) and clearing condition (14), expression (15) can be
Expressions (15) and (16) allow obtaining   as a function of the interest rate, the country's aggregate capital stock and regions' characteristics. We can easily deduce that, as the tax gap increases, there is a reallocation of capital from the economy that imposes higher taxes to the one with a lower tax rate.
An interesting case is the non-natural-endowment one. If   =   = 0, tax rates are equalized across regions, and then the optimal capital stock is given by the following closed-form solution obtained using expression (16):
Economy's  capital stock depends on is relative labor allocation and relative land surface. Because labor and capital are complementary in production, a relatively larger 9 labor endowment increases the capital stock. The effect of the relative land area, on the other hand, depends on whether the agglomeration externality effect dominates congestion. If it does (  1), more land reduces the optimal capital stock because, ceteris paribus, there is less population density. The opposite is true if congestion dominates (  1).
In absence of natural riches, it is also possible to derived a closed-form expression for the equilibrium interest rate. The production function (1), the expression for the interest rate in (15) , and the solutions for the optimal tax rate (13), and the capital stock (17), deliver
Density increases the equilibrium interest rate when the agglomeration effect dominates, because it causes a positive total factor productivity effect in the economy.
It is not possible to find out analytically the exact impact of changes in the natural endowment on the country's income level. Regions that enjoy a natural-resource discovery will reduce taxes, and attract capital; but whether this brings a gain or a loss for the nation is unclear. As a consequence, we carry out a quantitative exercise to dig deeper on this issue. We calibrate first the parameters, and then present the model predictions.
Calibration
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. Given that the share of natural-resource rents in U.S. GDP is only of about 086 percent -this was the value for 2009 according to World Bank (2011a) -we use the equilibrium in the non-natural-endowment case to perform this task; this considerably simplifies matters. (2000) report that a share of capital of 025, a land share of 005, and a labor share of 070 are consistent with the U.S. growth experience. We then assign values of 095 and 073 to  and , respectively. To pick a number for the agglomeration externality, we recall results in Ciccone and Hall (1996) . These authors estimate that  = 104; that is, doubling employment density in a county results in a 4 percent increase in total factor productivity. This gives a value of 11 to .
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The productivity parameter  in the production function is normalized to 1. Densities in the resource-abundant and resource-scarce regions are proxied using Ciccone and Hall's (1996) agglomeration index. Their measure of density is simply the intensity of labor, human, and physical capital relative to physical space. Density is high when there is a large amount of labor and capital per square foot. Their estimated range for the 50 contiguous U.S. states goes from the 11 of Montana, a resource-rich state, to the 167 estimated in the District of Columbia, a natural-resource poor area. Alaska, the less agglomerated and one of most natural resource rich states, is then not included in their analysis. Nevertheless, we choose     = 11 and     = 167.
The value of the aggregate capital stock  is, in turn, picked so that the capitaloutput ratio at steady state for the whole economy equals 3. Finally, the parameter , that is, the weight of public goods in the utility function is calibrated to reproduce the share of the U.S. government in GDP, used as a proxy for the ratio ( + ) in the model. In the last 30 years, U.S. government spending as a fraction of GDP has been between about 20 and 30 percent, depending of how you measure it. We choose an intermediate value of 25 percent; which implies that  equals 084.
Results
We now suppose that there is a natural resource windfall in region , and compute the equilibrium values of some key variables depending on the size of this shock. We consider a maximum value for   of 0036, which represents a 086 percent of the country's GDP in the  = 0 scenario. This maximum is a relatively big perturbation that amounts to the whole contribution in 2009 of natural resources to U.S. GDP. Figure 3 presents results for five different parameterizations. The first row gives the benchmark case described in the calibration section. The second row is obtained when the agglomeration externality parameter  rises to 2. In this case, the value of  is also modified to maintain the share of the public good invariant, and then abstract from demand-side effects. In the third row, the densities of the two regions are interchanged,     equals 167 and     equals 11. In the fourth row, the labor share  falls to 07, and is equivalent to making the lack of labor mobility less important. Finally, row 5 shows results when the share of the public good in total income ( + ) becomes 22%, lower than the benchmark.
The two columns in figure 3 provide results for tax rates and income levels (vertical The qualitative effects on tax rates and regional income are the same across rows.
In particular, when   =   = 0, tax rates in both regions coincide. As the natural endowment rises in , this region reduces pressure on taxpayers, attacking capital.
Region  then responds in the opposite direction, rising its capital tax rate to be able to finance public goods, thus amplifying the capital outflow. Income in region  falls due to this, but increases in region  because of both the capital inflow and the natural-resource discovery.
The difference across scenarios is quantitative as well as whether economy-wide income falls or not. Look at the dashed line in the RHS panels. In the benchmark economy (first row), the country's income falls as   increases. The reason is the labor's lack of mobility. This rigidity makes capital more sensitive to shocks. As capital moves away from the resource poor region, the economy gets as well away from the fullyflexible optimal capital-labor ratios -recall that diminishing marginal returns makes optimal to equalize capital-labor ratios across regions. The resource windfall moves the economy further away from that outcome, increasing the degree of inefficiency, and reducing country-wide output.
Agglomeration economies amplify the effect of input reallocations on output production. As a result, a larger agglomeration externality contributes to make the decrease in income larger as   rises (see row two in figure 3 ). If labor were fully mobile, the agglomeration externality would cause all labor and capital to move to region  as soon as new natural riches are discovered, increasing the nation's welfare level. A similar impact would be obtained if labor had a sufficiently large degree of mobility. However, when labor is sufficiently immobile, and as a consequence, the externality is de facto not able to induce increasing returns, only a fraction of capital is reallocated, and then the externality serves to generate a stronger effect on tax rates, and as a consequence, on total income. Mathematically, the effect on the tax rate can be seen in expression (9) , the impact of a larger   on   rises with , and  increases with .
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Row three presents results if natural-resource rich region are more densely populated that resource-poor areas; the opposite to what we observe in reality. Now, the negative effect on total income is weaker. The reason is again given by expression (9): as   rises, an increase in   induces a smaller variation in the tax rate   ; as a result, capital flows less and the effects on income become weaker. This is precisely the effect of a higher density in the region that enjoys the increase in , because the higher population density increases its initial capital stock.
Rows four and five in figure 3 represent two cases in which income levels in the country do not fall with natural riches. The first one (fourth row) is when the labor share is sufficiently low. This makes labor and, therefore, labor immobility less important. In the case of  = 07, the effect of a change in  on economy-wide output is negligible. We find the same effect in row five, which gives results when the share of pubic goods in total consumption falls to 22%. In both cases, the ultimate reason for the lack of a negative impact on total income is that taxes and, as a consequence, capital do not react as much in the resource-poor region to changes in .
In sum, theory shows that a natural-resource windfall can harm country's GDP due to fiscal decentralization. This is the case if regions fix taxes to try to attack capital, and there is sufficiently low degree of labor mobility. The effect is amplified by agglomeration economies and a larger density in resource-rich areas. A larger share of public-goods consumption in GDP also contributes to strengthen the negative impact.
Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical support for the main hypothesis of the paper; namely, that fiscally decentralized economies are more vulnerable to the growth curse of natural resources. It also tries to test the amplification mechanisms to which theory has pointed out. Given that the fundamental findings on the curse are rooted in the seminal work of Sachs and Warner (1997), subsection 3.1 tests our hypothesis using their database and cross-sectional methodology. Later, subsection 3.2 departs from Sachs and Warner and undertakes panel estimations using an extended sample of countries and years covered.
Finally, in subsection 3.3, we undertake various robustness checks.
A detailed description of all variables and their sources are given in appendix 2.
Appendix 3 provides the nations included in each of the samples. Appendix 4 presents descriptive statistics for all variables employ in the paper.
Cross-Section Tests
We first employ Sachs and Warner's (1997) data, variables, and cross-sectional estimation methodology. Because of limitations in the fiscal decentralization data, the original sample reduces to a cross-section of 52 countries that covers the period of 1970-1990.
We test the following model:
where  represents the country; is average annual growth in real per capita GDP during the interval 1970-1990;  is a vector of controls that includes resource share, initial income, openness, investment, institutional quality, ethnicity, terms of trade, education, fiscal decentralization, interactions terms of the natural resource share with ethnicity, institutional quality and fiscal decentralization, and a dummy for landlocked economies; and   is the disturbance.
We start using the GDP share of mineral output in 1970 as the resource share proxy. As for the fiscal decentralization measure, we follow Davoodi and Zou (1998), Oates (1985 Oates ( , 1993 In regression 2 we add the fiscal decentralization measure; results do not change.
In regression 3 we add the interaction term between the resource share proxy and fiscal decentralization; its coefficient is negative and significant which confirms our main hypothesis by showing that the negative growth effect of resources is transmitted through the decentralization channel. In addition, despite being non-significant, the coefficient on the resource share proxy becomes positive.
[Cannot follow the sentence:]
Results do not change qualitatively even if each of the variables in regression 3 are added to the regression separately, or in different order so that, for instance, the level of fiscal decentralization and its interaction term with resource share are added first rather than last. Results do not change either if other resource measures used by Sachs and Warner, like the share of primary exports in total exports or out of total GDP, are adopted.
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To further strengthen our claim, let us now try to test the main mechanisms that drive the result that fiscally decentralized nations do not benefit from resource windfalls: the lack of labor mobility, and agglomeration differences across regions. For this, we construct a measure that encompasses both of them. In particular, we divide each country's total non-agglomerated area by its total area (both in square kilometers). 14 Because lack of labor mobility should imply a lower degree of agglomeration in the nation, the constructed index is affected by labor mobility and by differences in agglomeration. 15 A higher value is interpreted as an indication of lower labor mobility The reason can be our limited sample, or the use of an output-based resource measure -as opposed to an export-based one used in their studies. 13 We present results using the GDP share of mineral output because it provides a larger sample. Nonetheless, we explicitly show with panel data that results hold using an exports-based measure in the following subsection.
14 The calculation of non-agglomerated areas follows the definition of non-agglomeration as given by the UN (on per-country basis). 15 Puga (1999) , for example, argues that labor mobility and agglomeration levels are positively correlated. 16 and agglomeration differences. 16 The model prediction is that decentralized economies with a higher index are more vulnerable to the growth curse. We multiply the initially used fiscal decentralization measure and the above index, and refer to the updated index as potential vulnerability.
Results are presented in regression 5, and confirm those presented in regression 3. This provides some validation to the underlying mechanism, implying that resource endowments hurt decentralized economies through the labor mobility and non-agglomeration channels.
One key concern in the resource curse literature is the potential endogeneity of Sachs the total stock of sub-soil assets, timber, non-timber forest resources, protected areas, cropland, and pastureland. This stock variable is arguably more exogenous to growth than Sachs and Warner's flow variables (specifically, the one used in the regressions of table 1), because it captures an economy's amount of proven natural reserves rather than its capacity to produce or export them.
In table 2 we reproduce the regressions presented in table 1, but using the GDP share of natural capital in 2000 as the resource share proxy. 17 As we can see in regression resource share is added; we observe that despite using this relatively more exogenous resource share measure, the coefficient on the interaction term remains negative and significant, further confirming the main hypothesis. Results hold as well in regression 12, when we adopt the previously discussed potential vulnerability measure.
The model implies that, in addition to agglomeration levels, the size of regional governments play a role as well: larger regional governments can potentially amplify 16 Importantly, the sample shows a weak relationship between this agglomeration measure and economic growth ( = 000,   0876), so that it is not necessarily the case that developed countries present a lower value, which mitigates endogeneity related concerns. 17 The World Bank also provides this measure for 1994 and 2005. Results do not change qualitatively in case either of them is used. The 2000 one is preferred because it provides the largest sample size of 51 countries. the negative growth effect of natural resources. We test this prediction, by reproducing regression 12 under a different potential vulnerability measure. Thus, we construct a new variable labeled modified potential vulnerability, in which we multiply the level of fiscal decentralization (vertical imbalance) by the GDP share of general government final consumption expenditure in 1972. Here we are assuming that larger shares at the national level imply larger shares at the regional level. Regression 14 presents the results using the new proxy for the interaction variable. The interaction term does not only remain strongly significant, but also increases in magnitude. This strengthens the empirical link to the model, and gives some indication that the size of regional governments may indeed be relevant for our hypothesis.
Fiscal decentralization can also suffer from endogeneity problems. Previous studies show that fiscal decentralization has several determinants, the key ones being land area, level of democracy, and level of income, each affecting fiscal decentralization positively. 18 Thus fiscal decentralization may in fact be endogenous to growth through an unobserved development factor; consequently, the positive association between income and fiscal decentralization could be creating an upward bias. We address this concern by taking an IV approach. In particular, we use the abovementioned determinant land area as instrument for fiscal decentralization. Land area is based on geographic factors, and therefore, should be exogenous to growth.
To implement this we follow Wooldridge's (2002) approach to instrument endogenous interaction terms. In the first stage, we predict fiscal decentralization using the instrument and the exogenous explanatory variables of the regression. We then interact 
Panel Data Analyses
The previous cross-sectional analyses, a la Sacks and Wagner, raise several concerns.
First, the time period covered is limited We estimate the following model:
The variables  ,   and   are the same ones as in regression (18) The interaction of resources with institutional quality also appears as non-significant.
Interestingly, regression 17 shows that our main result -a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term between fiscal decentralization and resource shareholds in this case as well.
To address the concern over the potential endogeneity of the fiscal decentralization measure, we once again employ an IV approach. In the fixed-effects framework, we can no longer adopt a time-fixed instrument as land area; we need to consider a time-varying one. We then consider, as instrument, the average level of democracy in the 10 years preceding the corresponding time interval. On the one hand, the democracy level is considered a key determinant of fiscal decentralization; on the other, the lagged average makes it relatively exogenous to growth in the following period.
The democracy measure is taken from the commonly used Polity IV Project. Estimation of the endogenous interaction term is done using the procedure discussed above.
Results appear in regression 18 of table 3. First stage results validate the instrument through the  -statistic. The second stage shows that the main result holds, as the interaction term of interest remains negative and significant.
Additional Robustness Checks
Regressions 19 to 23 in table 3, and table 4 Nonetheless, as we mentioned above, this measure has been criticized for its potential endogeneity to growth. We therefore take next an IV approach and instrument the exports-based proxy with the GDP share of discounted mineral rents in  − 1. We view this measure as a suitable IV, because it is highly correlated with the exports-based proxy ( = 074), and relatively exogenous to growth. Its exogeneity can be justified as follows: first, discounted primary rents is a stock that under reasonable assumptions can provide an indication for proven reserves or stocks of natural mineral capital, thus 20 making it less correlated with growth; second, mineral rents in developing economies are usually extracted by multi-national firms that bring their own technology and production factors, making these rents relatively independent of unobserved development indicators; last, the lagged value is arguably more exogenous to growth in the following period.
Estimation of the endogenous interaction terms is carried out using the previously estimations, the only difference is a relatively higher magnitude for the interaction term.
Our main result, therefore, seems to be robust to different decentralization measures.
One could argue that democracy is not a strong instrument for fiscal decentralization because is correlated with income. Above, we dealt with this employing lag values of the democracy variable that should suffer less from this criticism. Nevertheless, we now test the cross-sectional version of our panel to be able to employ the logarithm of land area as an instrument for fiscal decentralization, rather than democracy. More 
Conclusion
The question of why resource endowments lead to divergent outcomes continues to attract much interest among economists. This paper has presented a novel answer to that question. The hypothesis is that countries with a high degree of fiscal decentralization are more vulnerable to the natural resource curse.
We have presented a theory that suggests a simple mechanism for the occurrence of a natural resource curse in fiscally decentralized countries. In these economies, natural riches give the region in which they are located an advantage in the inter-regional competition over capital. This means that capital flows from natural-resource-poor areas to regions that experience natural-resource windfalls. We have shown that if labor mobility is constrained, total output in the country can drop as a result of such a movement of capital; put differently, the loss of output in resource-scarce regions outweighs the sum of the increase in output and natural resource rents in resourceabundant areas. We have also found that the negative effect is amplified because natural resources tend to be located in non-agglomerated and sparsely populated areas.
The main hypothesis has been empirically tested and confirmed. First, we have These insights carry certain policy implications for resource rich economies, especially in terms of emphasizing the importance of labor mobility and proper management 22 of resources in fiscally decentralized nations. Nonetheless, results may be sensitive to the specific periods and countries investigated. Future research should further test our results, and analyzed in more detailed the mechanisms that drive them. 22 .81 Standard errors are robust, clustered by country, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. In the first stage results only coefficient on the relevant instruments (level of democracy in t-1, and GDP share of mineral rents in t-1) are reported, yet regressions include all variables reported in the second stage results. Note that in regressions (18) and (23) only decentralization is instrumented (by the level of democracy in t-1), while in regressions (19) and (24) both decentralization and resource share are instrumented (the former by the level of democracy in t-1, and the latter by the GDP share of mineral rents in t-1). All regressions include an intercept. All variables are expressed as deviations from period means so that time fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. For description and source of variables as well as list of economies included in each regression and descriptive statistics see Appendices 2-4. robust, clustered by country, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. In the first stage results only the coefficient on the relevant instruments (level of democracy in t-1, and GDP share of mineral rents in t-1) is reported, yet the regression includes all variables reported in the second stage results. Note that in regression (28) only decentralization is instrumented (by the level of democracy in t-1), while in regression (29) both decentralization and resource share are instrumented (the former by the level of democracy in t-1, and the latter by the GDP share of mineral rents in t-1).All regressions include an intercept. All variables are expressed as deviations from period means so that time fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. For description and source of variables as well as list of economies included in each regression see Appendices 2 and 3. For descriptive statistics see Appendix 4.
23
Appendix 1: Agglomeration VS. Resources in Various Federations
Note that all graphs are at the federal-state level (so that each point represents a federal-state within the respective federation). All data was retrieved from the corresponding statistical bureaus of each federation. Resource share: Measure 1 (used in Table 1 ): Share of mineral production in total GDP in 1970 expressed as a number between 0 and 1 (snr).
Australia
Measure 2 (used in Table 2 Openness: The fraction of years over the period in which the country is rated as economically 'open', according to Sachs and Warner (1997) expressed as a number between 0 and 1 (open6590).
Investment:
The log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP, averaged over the period 1970-1989 (linv7089).
Institutional quality: The rule of law index from the International Country Risk Guide, in 1982, expressed as a number between one and six, six presenting best institutional quality and one least (rl).
Ethnicity: Measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization; measures the probability that two randomly-selected people from a country will not belong to the same ethnic or linguistic group, expressed as a number between 0 and 100 (ethling).
Terms of Trade:
The average annual growth rate in the log of the external terms of trade between 1970 and 1990 expressed as a number between -10 and 10. External terms of trade are defined as the ratio of an export price index to an import price index (dtt7090). Tables 1 and 2 
